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The Court of Appeals of North Carolina's Narrow Approach to
Trade Secrets Protection in North Carolina Farm Partnership
v. Pig Improvement Company
For many, the phrase "pig breeding" conjures up images of
muddied, hard-working farmers and crudely-constructed pig pens in
the countryside. And yet pig breeding today is far removed from
such rural scenes. Take, for example, the Pig Improvement Company
("PIC"), a U.S. company with offices in thirty countries around the
world.' Over the last forty years, PIC has invested millions of dollars
in confidential research and development on the genetic
improvement of pigs.2 The company engages in a sophisticated
process of pig breeding-identifying the desirable traits in pigs and
then running selective breeding programs in order to produce pigs
with enhanced genetic make-ups.3 The market for such selective pig
breeding is substantial.4 PIC's years of research have spawned pigs
that are both larger and leaner than other pigs, thereby making them
more desirable for commercial pork producers.' In light of the fact
that pork is now the most widely eaten meat in the world,6 PIC's
monetary investments in developing larger and leaner pigs have
bestowed substantial benefits on the pork industry.7
Unfortunately, last year the Court of Appeals of North Carolina
ignored these sizeable investments, as well as the benefits they have
produced. In North Carolina Farm Partnership v. Pig Improvement
1. See PIC Int'l Group, About Us, at http://www.pic.com/about-us/ (last visited Aug.
25, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
2. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 16, N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163
N.C. App. 318, 593 S.E.2d 126 (2004) (No. COA03-328).
3. See PIC Int'l Group, Business Model, at http://www.pic.coml../aboutus/
business_model.asp (last visited Aug. 25, 2005) [hereinafter PIC Int'l Group, Business
Model] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
4. Id. (stating that the company supplies breeding stock to the largest pork producers
in the world).
5. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 16, N.C. Farm P'ship (No. COA03-328)
(claiming that PIC's genetic methods have led to "improved litter size, growth rate, and
lean tissue percentages" in its pigs).
6. See Nat'l Pork Producers Council, Facts and Figures, at http://www.nppc
.org/resources/facts.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
7. See PIC Int'l Group, Business Model, supra note 3 ("PIC delivers significant value
to its customers in an industry where continual genetic improvement can be a key factor in
helping ensure a pig producer remains competitive.").
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Co.,' the court of appeals affirmed a lower court decision holding that
the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act9 does not protect
genetically-enhanced living organisms. 10 The court made it clear that
if another company were to obtain one of PIC's enhanced pigs, it
could freely breed them without incurring liability'"'-this, despite the
fact that every generation of pigs would pass to the next the PIC-
engineered pig's proprietary genetic information. 2
While North Carolina Farm Partnership solely addressed the
narrow issue of trade secret protection for genetically-modified pigs,
the potential impact of the court's opinion is more far-reaching. In
the wake of the North Carolina Farm Partnership holding, companies
that currently conduct confidential genetic research on animals-or
plants for that matter-will not be able to invoke North Carolina
trade secrets law to protect the genetic messages encoded in the
organisms, should one of them be wrongfully misappropriated by a
competitor.
This Recent Development argues that the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina failed to properly recognize that the North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act ("the Act") includes the protection of
genetic codes contained in living organisms. In light of the Act's
broad language, the way the Act has historically been interpreted by
North Carolina courts, and analogous cases from other jurisdictions,
this Recent Development posits that the North Carolina Farm
Partnership court should have recognized that genetic messages
encoded in living organisms are proper "trade secrets" under the Act.
This Recent Development further argues that the court should
have considered the policy arguments articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,3 the landmark
case in which the Court held that the federal Patent Act 4 included
patent protection for living organisms. 5 While the rubrics of patent
law and trade secrets law have distinct purposes-the former to
promote the disclosure of scientific inventions, the latter to protect
the confidentiality of such inventions-they share the common goal
of incentivizing research by extending legal protection to products of
8. 163 N.C. App. 318, 593 S.E.2d 126, discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 544, 599
S.E.2d 401 (2004).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 to -157 (2003).
10. N.C. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 323-24, 593 S.E.2d at 130-31.
11. Id. at 324, 593 S.E.2d at 131.
12. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 17, N.C. Farm P'ship (No. COA03-328).
13. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
15. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 318.
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human ingenuity and originality. 16 In that sense, Diamond helps shed
light on the larger aspirations of intellectual property law in general.
As a final matter, this Recent Development argues that the
genetic enhancement of plants and animals will yield substantial
medical, agricultural, and commercial benefits. The court's failure to
recognize any trade secrets protection in this area will stifle progress
in the field, hurting both consumers and businesses.
The North Carolina Farm Partnership case originated as a
dispute over a lease agreement. 7 North Carolina Farm Partnership
("NCF") was a multiplier farm1 8 that agreed to lease both pigs and
facilities in Warren County, North Carolina, to PIC.19 PIC was to use
the leased facilities for pig breeding.20  When the four-year lease
between the parties terminated, PIC failed to exercise its option to
purchase all of the genetically-modified pigs that it had bred at the
site.2 1 NCF then indicated that it intended to sell these modified pigs
for further breeding, while PIC maintained that the lease agreement
contemplated that NCF could sell the modified pigs for slaughter but
not for breeding. Faced with the prospect that its pigs would be sold
by NCF for further breeding, PIC first moved for a temporary
injunction in an Iowa district court; that injunction was granted in
January 2002.22 The Iowa court's injunction prohibited NCF from
selling as breeding pigs any of the 450 PIC pigs that NCF had
relocated to that state.3 Meanwhile, in April 2002, PIC filed a
separate motion for a temporary injunction in the Warren County
Superior Court, alleging that NCF's plans to sell the pigs for breeding
constituted misappropriation of a trade secret-in this case, the
genetics within the pigs-which PIC had developed at great
expense.24 The trial court refused to recognize that animal gene lines
are a trade secret, and denied PIC's motion for an injunction against
NCF.25 The court of appeals affirmed this decision, holding that the
16. See, e.g., 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 11.2 (2004) ("Although
trade secrets and patents have many similar intellectual property attributes, and
accomplish many of the same public policy goals, they differ markedly .... ).
17. N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163 N.C. App. 318, 319, 593 S.E.2d 126,
127, discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 544,'599 S.E.2d 401 (2004).
18. A "multiplier farm" consists of land and buildings that PIC leases from third
parties for purposes of raising and breeding pigs.
19. N.C. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 319, 593 S.E.2d at 127.
20. Id.
21. See PIC USA v. N.C. Farm P'ship, 672 N.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Iowa 2003).
22. Id. at 719-20.
23. Id. at 721.
24. N.C. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 319, 593 S.E.2d at 128.
25. Id. at 320-21,593 S.E.2d at 128-29.
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scope of the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act did not
include genetically-modified animals, and that there was no
"irreparable harm" warranting injunctive relief.26
The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act 27 was enacted
in 19818 with the goal of protecting a company's "interest in
information that is both confidential and commercially valuable.
29
The Act prohibits the "acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade
secret" without express or implied consent." The Act utilizes broad
statutory language in its definitions section, referring not only to eight
general categories of information that will connote a trade secret, but
also making clear that a trade secret should include, but not be
limited to, these eight categories.31 A "trade secret" is defined as any
"business or technical information, including but not limited to, a
formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information,
method, technique, or process":3 2 (1) that "derives ... commercial
value from not being generally known or readily ascertainable
through independent development or reverse engineering";33 and (2)
that its owner has kept reasonably secret.3 4 To prevail under the Act,
the owner of the trade secret must prove a misappropriation by
showing that the opposing party knew or should have known of the
secret nature of the information, and that the party acquired,
disclosed, or used the information without the consent of the owner.
If a misappropriation of a trade secret is proven, the "actual or
threatened misappropriation ... may be preliminarily enjoined" by
the court while the action is pending, and permanently enjoined for a
period of time if the court finds that a misappropriation has
occurred.36 Monetary damages may be awarded as well.37
26. Id. at 324, 593 S.E.2d at 131.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152 to -157 (2003).
28. Trade Secrets Protection Act, ch. 890, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1326 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (2003)).
29. Joseph E. Root III & Guy M. Blynn, Abandonment of Common Law Principles:
The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 823, 823
(1982).
30. § 66-152(1).
31. Id. § 66-152.
32. Id. § 66-152(3).
33. Id. § 66-152(3)(a).
34. Id. § 66-152(3)(b).
35. Id. § 66-155. See Combs & Assoc. v. Kennedy, 147 N.C. App. 362, 369, 555 S.E.2d
634, 639 (2001) (discussing remedies for misappropriation, but declining to find a trade
secret).
36. § 66-154(a).
37. Id. § 66-154(b)-(c).
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In analyzing what constitutes a trade secret under the Act, North
Carolina courts have typically relied upon the six factors articulated
by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Wilmington Star-News,
Inc. v. New Hanover Regional Medical Center.38 In that case, the
court reviewed judicial interpretations of trade secrets statutes in
other jurisdictions and adopted from them six factors that should be
considered in evaluating a trade secret claim:
1) [t]he extent to which information is known outside the
business; 2) the extent to which it is known to employees and
others involved in the business; 3) the extent of measures taken
to guard secrecy of the information; 4) the value of information
to business and its competitors; 5) the amount of effort or
money expended in developing the information; and 6) the ease
or difficulty with which the information could properly be
acquired or duplicated by others.39
The Wilmington Star-News factors have since been applied in a
number of North Carolina trade secrets cases.4° Various types of
confidential information have been recognized as trade secrets under
the Act41-among them internal "cost history" records,
42 price lists, 43
38. 125 N.C. App. 174, 480 S.E.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557, 488 S.E.2d 826
(1997). These six factors mirror the six factors set forth in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 757, cmt. B (1939), which addresses trade secrets.
39. Wilmington Star-News, 125 N.C. App. at 180-81, 480 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Ecolab,
Inc. v. Paolo, 753 F. Supp. 1100, 1111-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
40. See, e.g., Area Landscaping, LLC v. Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 520,
525-26, 586 S.E.2d 507, 511-12 (2003) (applying the six factor Wilmington Star-News test
to landscaping irrigation information disclosed to a competitor during a bidding process,
and concluding that the information was not a trade secret because steps were not taken to
ensure its secrecy); Combs, 147 N.C. App. at 363-70, 555 S.E.2d at 640 (applying the
Wilmington Star-News test to a company's internal e-mails and documents and concluding
they were not trade secrets because the information was not adequately secret); State ex
rel. Utils. Comm'n v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 132 N.C. App. 625, 634, 514 S.E.2d 276, 282
(1999) (applying the Wilmington Star-News test to local telephone service providers'
access line reports and concluding that the reports were trade secrets under the six-prong
test).
41. For a thorough discussion of the various types of data that have been recognized
as trade secrets under the Act, see David P. Hathaway, Comment, Is the North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act Itself a Secret, and Is the Act Worth Protecting?, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 2149,2176-86 (1999).
42. Drouillard v. Keister Williams Newspaper Servs., 108 N.C. App. 169, 171-73, 423
S.E.2d 324, 325-27 (1992), discretionary review denied, 333 N.C. 344, 427 S.E.2d 617
(1993).
43. Wilmington Star-News, 125 N.C. App. at 179-82, 480 S.E.2d at 55-57.
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market forecasts, 44 customer lists, 45 computer programs, 46 methods for
processing yarn, 47 and methods for modifying centrifuges.48
The court's opinion in North Carolina Farm Partnership is
relatively brief, providing scant insight as to why the genetics within
PIC's pigs would not be entitled to trade secrets protection. In
evaluating PIC's trade secrets claim, the court did not apply the
familiar six-prong Wilmington Star-News test.49  Nor did the court
examine under which categories of section 152 of the Act-if any-
the genetic information within a living organism might fall. Rather,
the court of appeals based its holding on two main factors. First, the
court claimed that PIC's trade secret claim was not sufficiently
specific and did not demonstrate "irreparable harm., 50  Second, the
court expressed reluctance over extending the protections of the Act
to living animals,5' presumably because they are not expressly
mentioned in- the language of the Act. Upon closer scrutiny,
however, neither of these reasons justifies the outcome of North
Carolina Farm Partnership.
The North Carolina Farm Partnership court stated that PIC's
claim failed to show the "existence of a trade secret. 5 2 Earlier North
44. N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.C. Dep't of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C.
App. 711, 718-19, 425 S.E.2d 440, 444-45 (1993).
45. Consol. Textiles v. Sprague, 117 N.C. App. 132, 134, 450 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1994).
46. Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, 108 N.C. App. 590, 596-97, 424 S.E.2d 226, 230-31
(1993).
47. Moore v. Am. Barmag Corp., 710 F. Supp. 1050, 1058-61 (W.D.N.C. 1989), affd,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
48. Travenol Labs. v. Turner, 30 N.C. App. 686, 694-95, 228 S.E.2d 478, 485 (1976)
(applying North Carolina trade secrets law before passage of the Trade Secrets Protection
Act).
49. N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163 N.C. App. 318, 322-24, 593 S.E.2d
126, 130-31 (analyzing PIC's trade secret claim by evaluating the statutory language and
case law, but not mentioning Wilmington Star-News), discretionary review denied, 358 N.C.
544, 599 S.E.2d 401 (2004). Had the court of appeals properly taken the approach
suggested by Wilmington Star-News, the court would have first applied each of the six
factors to PIC's case in order to determine whether the genetic information in PIC's pigs
was a trade secret. It should have used this six-step analysis even if it was quite ambivalent
over whether the genetics in PIC's pigs were proper trade secrets. Indeed, the Wilmington
Star-News court made clear that an ultimate decision as to what "constitutes" a trade
secret should only be reached after a court applies the six-factor test. See Wilmington
Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Reg'l Med. Ctr., 125 N.C. App. 174, 180-82, 480 S.E.2d
53, 56-58, appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557, 488 S.E.2d 826 (1997).
50. See N.C. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 323, 593 S.E.2d at 130 (finding that PIC
had put forth "general allegations, but no specific scientific evidence to support those
allegations").
51. See id. (stating that the court's research did not reveal "any cases involving the
application of trade secrets law to animals").
52. Id. at 324, 593 S.E.2d at 131.
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Carolina cases construing the Act have made clear that a trade secret
will not be found when there is a lack of specificity regarding what
constitutes the trade secret. Since trade secrets involve swift
injunctive relief, a moving party must articulate his reasons with
sufficient particularity such that a court may determine what
information has been misappropriated.53 In the instant case, the court
of appeals claimed that PIC's allegations concerning its biological
research and selective breeding were too general, and that this
absence of specific details left the court unsure about the precise
information or process that PIC sought to protect under the Act.54
PIC's was not the first case to fail on specificity grounds. Many
other trade secrets claims have suffered similar fates." And yet a
closer review of the North Carolina Farm Partnership opinion
suggests that the problem may have been more than just a lack of
particularity on PIC's part. Indeed, the Warren County trial court
never properly grasped what aspect of PIC's research was being
claimed for trade secret eligibility. The court of appeals was likely
misled by the erroneous analysis of the lower court.
For example, in denying PIC's trade secrets claim, the trial court
concluded that while PIC's breeding processes were valuable
intellectual property, "this fact does not make a pig[] a trade secret."56
53. FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (denying an injunction where the moving party failed to present "evidence of
specific trade secrets and processes"); Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 157 N.C. App.
462, 469, 579 S.E.2d 449, 454 (2003) ("We will not read into [plaintiff's] claims specific
identification of devices worthy of trade secret protection when it is [plaintiff's] burden to
come forward with evidence of such devices.").
54. N.C. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 323-24,593 S.E.2d at 130-31.
55. See, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1271,
1293 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (dismissing trade secrets claim without prejudice because plaintiff
failed to plead with adequate specificity which aspect of its enhanced pineapple it sought
to protect); FMC Corp., 899 F. Supp. at 1484 (declining trade secret protection in the
absence of any "evidence of specific trade secrets and processes"); Analog Devices, 157
N.C. App. at 472, 579 S.E.2d at 455 (rejecting a trade secrets claim because plaintiff did
not present "specific devices, combinations, or processes that would merit trade secret
protection"); S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines, 101 N.C. App. 292, 296-97, 399 S.E.2d
340, 343 (1991) (finding that a "general description" of the justification for defendant
researcher's animal experiments was not worthy of trade secrets protection).
56. N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., No. 01-CVS-15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug.
29, 2002) (order denying injunctive relief). NCF made a similarly misplaced argument to
the court of appeals, stating that PIC's trade secrets claim was invalid because it did not
involve any information, but a "living animal." See Plaintiffs Appellees' Brief at 25, N.C.
Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163 N.C. App. 318, 593 S.E.2d 126 (2004) (No.
COA03-328). In contrast, PIC had consistently maintained from the outset of the case
that its alleged trade secret was not in a living animal, but in the "confidential and unique
genetic material" contained therein, which it characterized as "protected intellectual
property." See Defendant Pig Improvement Co.'s Mot. for Temp. Inj. at 9, N.C. Farm
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In framing PIC's case that way, the trial court fundamentally
misconstrued that which was worthy of trade secrets protection. PIC
was not arguing that it owned a trade secret in a mere pig, but rather
that its trade secret was in the "genetics incorporated into [PIC's]
breeding animals. ' 57  PIC sought to protect the actual genetic
information in the cells of the pig-produced via years of selective
breeding-as it is the genetic information that ultimately determines
the pig's superior physical characteristics. In other words, the
company did not argue for trade secret protection for the pig itself,
nor for the breeding process, but for the proprietary genetic messages
encoded within the cells of the pig.58 This key distinction was lost on
the trial court,59 and it may have influenced the outcome of the case
on appeal.
Indeed, the court of appeals' observation that there existed no
case law "involving the application of trade secrets law to animals"'
evinces this fundamental mischaracterization of PIC's claim. PIC was
seeking to claim a trade secret in the genetic codes within that animal,
not the living animal itself. Put another way, the court of appeals
used the naked eye in evaluating PIC's trade secrets claim when it
should have used a microscope. The court's misformulation may
have been due in part to PIC's lack of specificity, but it also had its
roots in the lower court's initial failure to grasp that which PIC was
seeking to protect.
Another reason the North Carolina Farm Partnership court
refused to recognize a trade secret in the genes within PIC's pigs may
P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., Inc. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2002) (No. 01-CVS-15);
Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 19, N.C. Farm P'ship (No. COA03-328) (arguing that
"[t]he information at issue in this case is genetic information embodied in the pigs'
DNA").
57. NC. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 319, 593 S.E.2d at 128 (alteration in original).
58. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 19, N.C. Farm P'ship (No. COA03-328) ("[T]he
information at issue in this case is genetic information embodied in the pigs' DNA."). For
an analogous claim, see Del Monte, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. In that case, the plaintiff
invoked Florida's trade secrets statute in order to protect its interest in a variety of
pineapple it had scientifically developed, which purportedly contained "a higher vitamin C
content, a sweeter taste, more fiber, brighter color, a more pleasant smell, and a milder
texture." Id. at 1275. The defendant argued in response that the plaintiff could not claim
a trade secret in a pineapple, because a pineapple was not "information." Id. at 1291. The
district court summarily rejected this argument, stating that plaintiff did not "seek to
protect any pineapple as a trade secret. Rather, [plaintiff] seeks to protect its proprietary
interest in the MD-2 variety of pineapple." Id. (emphasis added).
59. See N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., No. 01-CVS-15 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Aug. 29, 2002) (order denying injunctive relief) ("[T]he court is far from convinced that
pigs themselves are trade secrets.").
60. N.C. Farm P'ship, 163 N.C. App. at 323, 593 S.E.2d at 130.
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have been because of its concerns about extending the Act, absent
clear language indicating that genetically-enhanced organisms were
worthy of protection. While the court's concerns-if any-about
judicial law-making are valid, they are misplaced, for the language of
the Act is already expansive enough to encompass genetic messages.
By recognizing a trade secret in PIC's genetic material, the court
would not have been extending the Act. Rather, it would have simply
been giving life to the intent of the North Carolina General Assembly
in drafting a broadly-worded, inclusive statutory scheme of
intellectual property protection. A review of the broad language of
the Act and its construction by North Carolina courts, as well as a
review of analogous trade secrets cases from other jurisdictions,
suggest that the outcome in North Carolina Farm Partnership should
have been different.
The Act defines "trade secret" to mean "business or technical
information, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program,
device, compilation of information, method, technique, or process. "61
The use of the phrase "including but not limited to" in the Act's trade
secrets definition makes the Act broader than the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, which lacks such language. 62 The language of the North
Carolina Act is also broader and more inclusive than the Restatement
of Torts, which defines a trade secret as "a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, or a pattern for a machine or other device," as long as it is
used continuously in the operation of a business.63  If such
information has commercial value because it is not readily
ascertainable, and if such information is reasonably secretive, it will
be protected from misappropriation under the North Carolina Act.
64
In light of this broad definition, it is not immediately clear why
the genetic lines embodied in a living organism could not be
considered a trade secret. PIC's genetic messages could properly be
construed as either "formulae" or "compilations of information"
under the language of Act.65 With respect to the "formulae"
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2003).
62. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990) (stating that a trade
secret "means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process," without stating that the definition may also extend beyond
those explicit categories). See also Hathaway, supra note 41, at 2158 (comparing the
North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
63. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (2004).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3).
65. The other categories of the Act, such as "methods," "techniques," "patterns," and
"processes," typically pertain to methods of operation, such as manufacturing methods.
20051 1575
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category, North Carolina courts have held that this includes recipes
and chemical compounds, such as silvering solutions used to make
mirrors.66 Assuming it is the synthesizing of various divergent
components into a single proprietary compound that connotes a
formula, genetic codes could likewise be construed as formulae.
While PIC does not own a secret formula for its pig, it does merge
together various genetic traits during its selective, proprietary
breeding process. According to the company, favorable genetic lines
are combined from various pig strains-among them Large White
pigs, Landrace pigs, Duroc pigs, and Meishan pigs-all with the goal
of obtaining a "compound" pig with all of PIC's advantageous genetic
traits.67 This consolidation of genetic traits in a single animal is
analogous to a recipe or a chemical compound, even if it is somewhat
more abstract than a traditional "formula."
Moreover, PIC's genetic messages could be construed as
"compilations of information" under the language of the Act.
Although North Carolina courts have typically construed the
"compilations of information" category as referring to confidential
documents that compile data, such as company price lists' and
feasibility studies,69 a genetic code could nevertheless be construed as
a compilation of information. Over the course of its selective
breeding process, PIC compiles all of the favorable genetic traits that
it has selected into a single pig's stock. In that sense, PIC's selectively
bred pigs are analogous to a customer list that compiles valuable data,
even if the pigs' DNA is not as tangible as a business document.
Assuming the phrases "formulae" or "compilations of
information" include the genetic codes in PIC's pigs, it seems clear
that the codes-which caused the pigs to be physically larger and
While PIC perhaps could have argued that its methods of selective breeding constituted a
"method," "technique," "pattern," or "process," its decision to claim "the genetic
information in the pigs' DNA" made it more likely that its genetic codes would be
construed as a "formula" or a "compilation of information." See Defendant-Appellant's
Brief at 19, NC. Farm P'ship (No. COA03-328).
66. See Potter v. Hileman Labs., Inc., 150 N.C. App. 326, 331, 564 S.E.2d 259, 263
(2002).
67. See PIG Int'l Group, Products, at http://www.pic.com/products (last visited Aug.
25,2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
68. See Wilmington Star-News, Inc. v. New Hanover Reg'l Med. Ctr., 125 N.C. App.
174, 179-82, 480 S.E.2d 53, 55-57 (1997), appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557, 488 S.E.2d 826
(1997).
69. See N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. N.C. Dept. of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., 108 N.C.
App. 711, 718, 425 S.E.2d 440, 444 (1993) (finding that documents containing valuable




leaner-would constitute information with a commercial value
because they are not generally known or readily ascertainable.7"
PIC's genetic codes were the subject of secrecy, they were not
generally known, nor were they capable of being easily reproduced.
NCF conceded as much, providing an affidavit from an expert that
stated that PIC's competitors would not be able to work backwards to
determine the genetic messages within PIC's pigs "without first
performing years of tests."7 Thus, assuming such confidential genetic
codes were viewed as "formulae" or "compilations of information"
under the language of the Act, they would clearly be entitled to trade
secrets protection were they to be wrongfully misappropriated by a
competitor. It is difficult to reconcile the inclusive language of the
Act with the court's narrow construction of the Act in North Carolina
Farm Partnership.
And yet an argument in favor of recognizing genetic codes as
trade secrets need not be based solely on the broad language of the
Act. North Carolina courts that have construed the definition of a
trade secret under the Act have historically taken a more inclusive
approach, focusing less on the set categories of section 152, and more
on the inherent value of the information and the level of secrecy
surrounding it.72 One court seemed to minimize the import of the
70. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(3) (2003) (requiring that a trade secret derive
"independent actual or potential commercial value from not being generally known or
readily ascertainable").
71. N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163 N.C. App. 318, 324, 593 S.E.2d 126,
130-31, discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 544, 599 S.E.2d 401 (2004). See also 1
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.07 (2005) ("[A] matter cannot be considered a trade
secret if it is well known or readily ascertainable."); Peter J. Courture, Independent
Derivation and Reverse Engineering, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TRADE SECRET
PROTECTION AND LITIGATION: PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION 623 (1992) ("The more difficult, time consuming, and costly it
would be to develop the information, the less likely it is 'readily' ascertainable.").
72. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 200 F. Supp.
2d 541, 544-45 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (finding that customer and vendor lists are adequately
defined as trade secrets under the Act, without tying those categories of information
directly to the definitions of section 152); Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, 108 N.C. App.
590, 594-96, 424 S.E.2d 226, 228-30 (1993) (analyzing whether a computer program is a
trade secret by inquiring into the secrecy surrounding it, rather than asking under which
particular category of section 152 the computer program would fall). North Carolina law
is not unique in focusing primarily on the commercial value of the information and the
level of secrecy surrounding that information rather than on set statutory definitions. See,
e.g., Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the key
consideration in analyzing a trade secret claim is whether the information is secret). Other
jurisdictions have gone further than this. Rather than parsing the language of a trade
secrets statute, for example, some courts have allowed for the legal protection of
confidential, proprietary information even if it does not rise to the level of a trade secret.
See, e.g., Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991)
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definitional categories of section 152, broadly defining a trade secret
as including any "sufficiently suggestive research data that would give
a person skilled in the art a competitive advantage he might not
otherwise enjoy but for the knowledge gleaned from the owner's
research investment.
73
The six-factor test articulated in Wilmington Star-News74 is a
perfect example of this inclusive approach to defining a trade secret.
In that case, the court focused less on what particular category of the
Act a company's price list fell under, and more on the totality of the
circumstances, including the commercial benefits the list would
bestow, as well as the efforts taken to guard the list's secrecy.75 Had
the court of appeals relied on the Wilmington Star-News approach in
evaluating PIC's claim, the court would have concluded that genetic
codes fall under the protections of the Act. 76 The genetic traits of
PIC's pigs were not generally known outside of its business, but were
well-known by the scientists who conducted the selective breeding
process within the business; the enhanced breeding pigs were
carefully guarded7 7 by PIC to prevent any misappropriation; the genes
of the enhanced pigs, with their leaner tissue masses and their
increased growth rates, were clearly of value to the company; the
amount of money PIC had expended in research and development
was substantial; and PIC's genetic information could not be easily
(stating that an item may be protected as confidential information without rising to the
level of a trade secret); Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1167 (N.J. 2001)
(stating that whether information is a trade secret should not end a court's analysis,
because information may still be "legally protectable as confidential and proprietary
information" even if it is not a trade secret).
73. Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 931 F. Supp. 1280, 1299 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (applying
North Carolina trade secrets law), affd, 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
74. 125 N.C. App. 174, 480 S.E.2d 53 (1997), appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 557, 488
S.E.2d 826 (1997); see supra text accompanying note 39.
75. Id. at 180-82, 480 S.E.2d at 56-57.
76. The court of appeals gave no reason as to why the Wilmington Star-News test was
not applied in North Carolina Farm Partnership. In fact, the court did not even mention
Wilmington Star-News. This absence was somewhat puzzling, as the case's six-factor test
has been applied in numerous other North Carolina trade secrets cases. See cases cited
supra note 40. It seems at least arguable that the court opted not to apply the test because
doing so would have mandated a different result.
77. The Multiplier Agreement between the parties contained an express provision
obligating NCF to refrain from disclosing "PIC breeding techniques, feeding programs, or
other information furnished by PIC in connection with the development and maintenance
of the multiplier herd." N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., No. 01-CVS-15 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2002) (order denying injunctive relief). The Agreement also
prohibited NCF from "selling or using pigs for breeding purposes" without the consent of
PIC. Id.
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duplicated or readily ascertained. In other words, the recognition of
genetically-modified living organisms as trade secrets is not only
mandated by the broad language of the Act, but also by North
Carolina courts' historically inclusive construction of the proper
definition of a "trade secret."
In addition, analogous cases from other jurisdictions suggest that
trade secrets protection of a company's proprietary genetic strains is
entirely warranted. For example, in Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v.
DeKalb Genetics Corp. 79 a corporation claimed a trade secret in a
type of genetically-engineered corn that was herbicide resistant.8'
The company, Rhone-Poulenc Agro ("RPA"), had created a genetic
construct called RD-125 by combining a peptide with a maize gene
that had been mutated. 81 RPA licensed this gene to the defendant,
DeKalb.82 When DeKalb licensed the corn line to a third party, RPA
sued, alleging misappropriation of a trade secret.83 The jury, applying
North Carolina law, concluded that the genetic construct within the
corn was a trade secret. 84 The Federal Circuit affirmed the jury's
finding.8
Similarly, in Pioneer Hi-Bred International v. Holden Foundation
Seeds, Inc.,86 the plaintiff claimed a trade secret in a type of hybrid
corn seed it had genetically engineered, H3H, which apparently
78. As noted above, NCF seemed to concede that PIC's genetic messages were not
readily ascertainable. See supra text accompanying note 71. The company provided the
affidavit of a professor of animal science and genetics who stated that it would be
impossible for PIC's competitors to "work backwards to figure out what [PIC] did to
develop [a] pig." N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163 N.C. App. 318, 324, 593
S.E.2d 126, 130-31, discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 544, 599 S.E.2d 401 (2004). This
was a somewhat unusual argument for NCF to be making, since information is typically
more likely to be a trade secret if it is not readily ascertainable through reverse
engineering. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 66-152(3)(a) (2003) (defining one of the characteristics
of trade secrets as not being "readily ascertainable through ... reverse engineering").
NCF's argument was a strategic one. The company seemed to be suggesting that the
genetics within PIC's pigs were wholly incapable of being ascertained or duplicated by
anyone, and that therefore it was impossible for NCF or anyone else to "misappropriate"
such information. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 23-33, N.C. Farm P'ship (No.
COA03-328). In other words, NCF asserted that there was no actual information for PIC
to protect, because it was not readily ascertainable by any party-PIC included.
79. 272 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 538 U.S. 974 (2003).
80. Id. at 1340.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1340-41.
83. Id. at 1342-43.
84. Id. ae 1343, 1358.
85. Id. at 1359-60.
86. 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
possessed superior qualities.' Unlike NCF, the allegedly-infringing
defendant in Pioneer did not dispute the characterization of genetic
messages in corn as trade secrets.88 Rather, the defendant conceded
from the outset that a company could claim a proprietary interest in
parent gene lines.89 Thus the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
applying Iowa trade secrets law,90 presupposed in its analysis that
genetic codes could qualify for trade secret status.91
Although both Rhone-Poulenc and Pioneer involve genetic
constructs in corn rather than a living animal, these cases speak more
generally to the idea that genetic codes-if they are sufficiently secret,
commercially valuable, and difficult to ascertain-may be entitled to
trade secret protection. Such a concept is directly analogous to a
genetically-enhanced organism, such as a pig. These two cases, as
well as the broad language of the Act and its traditionally inclusive
construction by North Carolina courts, suggest that North Carolina
Farm Partnership should have been decided differently.
One approach that might have led the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina to a different outcome in North Carolina Farm Partnership
would have been to heed a more policy-driven approach, such as the
one taken by the United States Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty.92 In that case, the Court held that genetically-modified
living organisms were patentable subject matter93 under the language
of the federal Patent Act.94 The Supreme Court's interpretation of
patent protection in light of the inclusive language of the Patent
87. Id. at 1228.
88. Id. at 1235.
89. Id.
90. Iowa, whose trade secrets statute uses almost the exact same language as the
North Carolina act, has taken an extremely inclusive approach to trade secrets. Its courts
have found that the scope of the phrase "trade secrets" includes "virtually any category of
information, including recipes for sandwiches, pizza sauce, and crust." See Hathaway,
supra note 41, at 2169-70. Iowa's expansive approach to trade secrets law in general-and
the Pioneer court's holding in particular-may be related to Iowa's predominantly
agricultural market, where agricultural breeding, cross-pollination, and genetic
engineering are undoubtedly more common than in other states. In any event, it seems
likely that PIC would have benefited from the expansive approach that Iowa courts take
to trade secrets issues. Indeed, the district court in Iowa (where PIC first moved for an
injunction) accepted the argument that its genetic material was a trade secret, holding that
"unauthorized dissemination of genetic material to [NCF] ... would adversely affect
[PIC's] ability to protect its trade secrets." PIC USA v. N.C. Farm P'ship, 672 N.W.2d 718,
721 (Iowa 2003) (emphasis added).
91. Pioneer, 35 F.3d at 1235.
92. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
93. Id. at 310.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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Actg-as well its general admonition against hampering innovation in
genetic research by denying companies the protection of law
96 -
resonate in light of North Carolina Farm Partnership. The Diamond
Court's insights into patent law are helpful in understanding how the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina should have construed the North
Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act.
This is not to suggest that patent law and trade secrets law are
entirely analogous; there are notable differences between the two.
First and foremost, patent law is a creature of federal statute,
97
whereas trade secrets law is grounded in the statutes of individual
states, each with its own definitions and requirements.98 Patent law
grants the holder of a patent an exclusive right for a limited period as
an incentive to risk the costs in research and development; the holder
of a patent is granted a right of exclusion in exchange for the
inventor's full disclosure of the invention." Trade secrets law, on the
other hand, is concerned with standards of commercial ethics."°°
While disclosure is a requirement of patent law, secrecy is essential to
a trade secret; the owner of a trade secret must show that except by
the use of improper means there would be difficulty acquiring the
information.'' Each body of law has its own distinct emphasis; patent
law is focused on promoting an invention's disclosure, while trade
secrets law is focused on protecting an invention's secrecy.
1°2
95. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 308-09.
96. Id. at 317.
97. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
98. For a review of various states' trade secrets laws, see Hathaway, supra note 41, at
2155-66.
99. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480-81 (1974).
100. Id. at 481.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 475. See also Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35
F.3d 1226, 1238 n.42 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[tirade secret law and patent law ...
serve quite different functions"). The distinct emphases of patent law and trade secrets
law-the former on disclosure, the latter on secrecy-signify that a company usually must
choose between one or the other in terms of seeking legal protection. As one federal
court noted, any time an invention qualifies as a valid trade secret, the inventor will not
have disclosed the idea sufficiently to obtain a patent. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 931
F. Supp. 1280, 1298 (E.D.N.C. 1996), aff'd, 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Conversely, the
owner of a valid patent will have been forced to disclose the best method for practicing the
invention, effectively destroying any trade secret protection he might have had. Id. See
also Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 1359-60 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (recognizing a company's trade secret, but holding that the period of trade
secret protection terminated when a patent was issued and the idea was fully disclosed).
Therefore, a company will not usually claim a trade secret and a valid patent
simultaneously. Typically a company must choose one or the other form of legal
protection, depending on the precise nature of the information it is seeking to protect.
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Despite these differences, there are similarities between patent
law and trade secrets law. Both patent law and trade secrets law fall
under the general rubric of intellectual property law, which is a
nebulous, highly elusive concept.1"3  Intellectual property law's
essential purpose is to offer legal protection to the products of the
human mind. This goal is extremely difficult to accomplish, however,
as the human mind is constantly creating new, unforeseen inventions.
Neither the Patent Act, nor the North Carolina Trade Secrets
Protection Act-nor any other statute protecting intellectual property
for that matter-can ever adequately address, via express statutory
language, every conceivable human invention that is worthy of
protection. This is the main reason why intellectual property statutes
like the Patent Act and the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection
Act tend to be so broadly worded."° Their broad language reflects a
legislative realization 5 that new inventions will continually be
created, and that these new inventions are worthy of legal protection,
even if they were not foreseen at the time of a statute's drafting. In
that sense, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Patent Act in Diamond can be influential in interpreting the North
Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act.
Diamond involved a patent application for a genetically-
modified bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components
of crude oil."6 The Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") denied the
patent, both because micro-organisms are "products of nature"1 °7 and
103. See Pioneer, 35 F.3d at 1238. Although trade secrets law also incorporates
common law contract principles, it is typically treated as a subset of intellectual property
law.
104. Indeed, the Patent Act and the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act are
not the only intellectual property statutes that employ inclusive, open-ended language.
For a case in which the Supreme Court concluded that the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1051-1127 (2004), employed language that was "not restrictive," and that therefore its
protections applied to a company seeking a trademark in a color, see Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
105. See, for example, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), where the Court
stated:
The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined statutory subject
matter as "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any improvement thereof" ... subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870,
and 1874 employed this same broad language .... The committee reports
accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject
matter to include "anything under the sun that is made by man."
Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 305.
107. Interestingly, NCF relied on a similar argument in North Carolina Farm
Partnership, arguing that "[n]ature created the DNA in the pigs." Plaintiffs Appellees'
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because living micro-organisms are not patentable subject matter
under the Patent Act. °8 Section 101 of the Patent Act provides
patent protection for any "process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof."' 19 The PTO found that living things did not fall into any of
those categories."1  Therefore, the bacterium was not patentable."'
The Supreme Court reversed the PTO's rejection, holding that a live,
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under
section 101, as either a "manufacture" or a "composition of
matter.""
n2
The Diamond Court based its holding in large part on the
general language of the Patent Act.'13 According to the Court, such
terms as "manufacture," and "composition of matter," evinced an
understanding that the patent laws must be given wide scope." 4 The
Court found that section 101 contained broad language, and therefore
the Court was willing to recognize living organisms as protected
matter under the Act."5 The Diamond opinion also explained that
the Patent Act employed general language because many scientific
inventions are unforeseeable at the time of a statute's drafting."'
The Court was also not persuaded by the PTO's finding that the
bacterium was a product of nature and therefore not patentable. The
Brief at 23, N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., 163 N.C. App. 318, 593 S.E.2d 126
(No. COA03-328).
108. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 306.
109. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
110. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 306.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 307-10. See also Kevin W. O'Connor, Patenting Animals and Other Living
Things, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 602-03 (1991) (reviewing the Court's holding in
Diamond). For a discussion of the ripple effects of the Court's holding in Diamond,
including the PTO's eventual decision in 1987 to recognize non-naturally occurring multi-
cellular living organisms as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, see James P.
Daniel, Of Mice and "Manimal": The Patent and Trademark Office's Latest Stance
Against Patent Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 108-18
(1999); Stephen G. Whiteside, Patents Claiming Genetically Engineered Inventions: A Few
Thoughts on Obtaining Broad Property Rights, 30 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1019, 1025-28
(1996). In the years following Diamond, the patent community has continued to struggle
over how far to extend patent protection in living organisms, DNA and other genetic
material. See generally O'Connor, supra (discussing the import of Diamond and the
ongoing concerns raised by patenting living organisms). While the ongoing debate in the
patent community may have been part of the reason for the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina's hesitation to extend trade secrets protection to this field, no such concern is
mentioned in the North Carolina Farm Partnership opinion.
113. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 315.
114. Id. at 308.
115. Id. at 310.
116. Id. at 316.
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Court plainly rejected this argument, concluding that the bacterium
was not in any way naturally-occurring. The Court instead pointed
out that the bacterium possessed markedly different characteristics
from bacteria found in nature, and that therefore it was clearly a
product of human ingenuity.
117
In reviewing the Court's reasoning in Diamond, a few points
should be noted. First, the Court's broad interpretation of the Patent
Act stands in striking contrast to the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina's cursory review of the language of the North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act in North Carolina Farm Partnership-
this, despite the fact that both statutes are broadly worded so as to
encompass a wide range of intellectual property interests. If the
Supreme Court identified such terms as "manufacture" or
"composition of matter" as expansive terms, such that they included
living organisms, it is not immediately apparent why the trade secrets
act-with terminology such as "compilation of information,"
"formula," "technique," and "process"-would not possess similarly
wide breadth. On the face of the language of the two Acts, it is not
clear why the outcomes of the two cases should be so divergent."8
Second, the Diamond Court was clearly more aware of the
greater public interest in promoting scientific research and
development through an inclusive construction of the patent laws.
The Court refused to give credence to the idea that unanticipated
inventions should be denied legal protection. On the contrary, the
Court observed that "the inventions most benefiting mankind are
those that push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the
like." '119 The Court also warned against any judicial attempts to
hamper scientific development by narrowly construing intellectual
property laws.12° In light of a clear choice between whether research
efforts would be incentivized via legal protection, or stifled due to a
lack of legal protection, 1' the Diamond Court erred in favor of
117. Id. at 310.
118. While perhaps the outcome hinged on the particular legislative history of the
Patent Act, as well as the distinct purpose of the patent laws to "promote the progress of
science and useful arts," it can be argued that both acts share the goal of protecting
products of human ingenuity, and that both acts purport to do so by using broad and
expansive statutory language. In light of those shared aims, it is not immediately clear
why one statute should be much more narrowly construed than the other.
119. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 316 (quoting Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)).
120. See, e.g., id. at 317 (stating that "judicial fiats as to patentability will not deter the




encouraging scientific research by interpreting the Patent Act to be
broad and non-restrictive.
To be sure, the Diamond case is not entirely analogous to North
Carolina Farm Partnership. The bacterium in Diamond was created
through the introduction of new genetic material into a living
organism,122 a process that is much more sophisticated than PIC's
selective pig breeding. Whereas the bacterium in Diamond was
created by microscopically integrating DNA strains, PIC's process
was somewhat cruder, as it involved strategically breeding swine in
order to produce a higher occurrence of preferred genetic traits in
certain offspring.123 Moreover, the plaintiff in Diamond sought a
patent, which offers a much higher standard of legal protection than
trade secrets law. Unlike the plaintiff in Diamond, PIC did not have,
nor did it ever apparently seek, a patent for its genetically-modified
swine; the company instead attempted to invoke the different type of
protection afforded under trade secrets law. Despite these
differences, the Diamond opinion still stands for the general
proposition that the genetics in living organisms may embody
valuable information meriting the protection of law.
124
Moreover, PIC's failure to obtain a patent in North Carolina
Farm Partnership does not necessarily mean that it should be barred
from any level of intellectual property protection. Despite the fact
that they offer less protection than patents, trade secrets still have an
important "part to play in the technological and scientific
advancement of the [n]ation." The Supreme Court has noted that
trade secrets law may provide useful legal protections for works that
are "doubtfully patentable and clearly unpatentable. ' '126  It is likely
that PIC's genetic codes were just such information-secretive,
proprietary, and highly valuable, but not sophisticated enough to be
patentable. Trade secrets law and patent law each have a particular
122. See Daniel, supra note 112, at 108.
123. Michael E. Sellers, Patenting Nonnaturally Occurring, Man-made Life: A
Practical Look at the Economic, Environmental, and Ethical Challenges Facing Animal
Patents, 47 ARK. L. REV. 269, 270-71 (1994) (stating that selective breeding is much more
unpredictable and much less precise than hybridization and DNA insertion).
124. See, e.g., Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen O'Rourke, A False Start? The Impact
of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 163, 229 (1996)
(stating that since Diamond, "it has been settled law that, while naturally occurring
phenomena are not patentable, genetically-engineered living organisms may fall within the
Patent Act's statutory subject matter").
125. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,493 (1974).
126. Id. at 491. See also Root & Blynn, supra note 29, at 827 ("Trade secrecy offers
advantages over the patent system, particularly in situations in which the devices or
processes to be protected are of doubtful patentability.").
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role to play in the overall scheme of intellectual property protection,
and "the operation of one does not take away from the need for the
other.' 1 27 In fact, one commentator has described trade secrets law as
an efficient alternative to patent protection for companies, and has
noted in particular that a trade secret in a genetically-modified animal
might be a practical alternative to a patent where the animal has a
high intrinsic value and is somewhat limited in number.128 In other
words, the Diamond analogy to North Carolina Farm Partnership
does not fall short merely because one case involved patent law and
the other trade secrets law.
Most significantly, Diamond exemplifies an inclusive approach to
interpreting the language of intellectual property statutes in general,
and the Patent Act in particular, and it demonstrates a keen
awareness of the effect such an approach would have on research and
development. Had the Court of Appeals of North Carolina followed
such an inclusive approach in North Carolina Farm Partnership, it
might have recognized that the North Carolina Trade Secrets Act
properly includes genetically-enhanced organisms as trade secrets
worthy of protection.
Unfortunately, North Carolina Farm Partnership makes no
mention of the potential detrimental effects of limiting trade secret
protection solely to non-living objects. The opinion is utterly devoid
of the public policy concerns so prevalent in Diamond. This lack of
policy analysis is particularly noteworthy as North Carolina Farm
Partnership involved genetic enhancement via selective breeding, a
research field which is not only financially lucrative, but which also
has the potential to convey numerous medical and commercial
benefits on the public. It is likely that the court of appeals' narrow
approach to trade secrets could have the long-term effect of stifling
progress in the field of genetic research-whether it be the selective
breeding in which PIC was engaged, or more advanced forms of
biotechnology.
Research involving the genetic engineering of plants and animals
has grown steadily in recent years.'29 With respect to animals, there
has been growth in research involving "transgenic animals"-that is,
an animal whose DNA has been augmented by adding DNA from
another living organism. 3 ' While the bulk of the transgenic animal
research is carried out by organizations like the National Institutes of
127. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 493.
128. See O'Connor, supra note 112, at 612.




Health, which conducts such research for biomedical purposes, such
research is also thriving in the agricultural fields, with an explosion in
transgenic livestock and poultry."' The National Science Foundation
expects that projects involving transgenic animals will increase in the
coming years. 32 In addition to animals, the market for genetically-
enhanced plants has also grown markedly, as evidenced by the
herbicide-resistant corn in Rhone-Poulenc or the sweeter, vitamin C-
enhanced pineapple in Del Monte. Although these biotechnology
experiments are not entirely analogous to PIC's selective pig
breeding, all of the processes do involve the production of genetic
material that is somehow favorable or competitively advantageous,
and all of them involve sizeable investments of both scientific
resources and capital. According to the court's blanket holding in
North Carolina Farm Partnership, none of these confidential genetic
experiments would be protected from misappropriation by a third
party competitor. In the absence of a valid patent, any one of these
confidential experiments would be fair game. And while one can
hope that that the Court of Appeals of North Carolina might later
retreat from its blanket ruling if it were faced with a trade secret
involving a more technical and sophisticated method of genetic
modification-a hope that is arguably nurtured by the court's finding
that PIC's case was devoid of "specific scientific evidence"' 33-its
current North Carolina Farm Partnership. holding nevertheless
remains unlimited in its breadth. Based on the language of the
court's opinion, "the application of trade secrets law to animals' 134 is
wholly precluded, regardless of the method involved.
To make matters worse, the potential benefits-both commercial
and medical-of such genetic enhancement and biotechnological
research are substantial. To take one example, the USDA's
Agricultural Research Service is currently conducting research on
chickens engineered by recombinant DNA, with the goal of
developing poultry that will be resistant to the avian leukosis virus.'35
If eventually successful, such research would benefit not only poultry
producers and farmers, but also the greater public.'36 Such research is
131. Id. at 611.
132. Id.
133. N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., Inc., 163 N.C. App. 318, 323, 593
S.E.2d 126, 130, discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 544, 599 S.E.2d 401 (2004).
134. Id.
135. See O'Connor, supra note 112, at 611.
136. See Sellers, supra note 123, at 271 ("The application of these new technologies to
animals is expected to produce many new results, including increased growth
performance, higher disease resistance, and certain reproductive traits which will
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one example of the myriad of biotechnology projects that could yield
both commercial and health benefits.
In one sense, these projects confirm the Diamond Court's
original suspicion that courts and legislatures will never fully succeed
in deterring the scientific mind from probing into the unknown.37
And yet it is not sufficient to blithely claim that these research
projects will continue regardless of the level of intellectual property
protection that is afforded to them. On the contrary, one of the key
purposes of intellectual property law should be to encourage scientific
research and innovation-to incentivize it-by providing legal
protection to both individuals and corporations. The Diamond Court
clearly recognized the danger that research efforts could be hampered
if there were no legal incentives in place, and it responded by
recognizing that patent law was broad enough to encompass genetic
research.
138
In contrast, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina's narrow
approach to trade secrets law could have the long-term effect of
stifling research and development in these areas, especially with
respect to those agricultural companies, such as PIC, whose research
may not be scientifically advanced enough to warrant full-blown
patent protection.139 As the United States Supreme Court once
stated, one goal of trade secrets law should be to "encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach," in order to
"prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery
and exploitation of his invention."'4 ° By narrowly construing trade
secrets law in North Carolina Farm Partnership, the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina appears to have lost sight of that greater goal. In
the wake of the court's holding, a North Carolina company engaged
in genetic research must either seek patent protection, or risk its
research being plucked from under it, with no recourse against the
party taking the information. Trade secrets law will offer it no middle
ground of protection. Moreover, the North Carolina court's narrow
approach could have a detrimental effect on the economic health of
collectively lower costs to farmers and produce a more beautiful product for the
consumer.").
137. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Root & Blynn, supra note 29, at 827 ("Trade secrecy offers advantages
over the patent system, particularly in situations in which the devices or processes to be
protected are of doubtful patentability.").
140. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,485 (1974).
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the state, in the event companies engaged in genetic research opt to
do business in a more permissive jurisdiction, such as Iowa.'
Nor will contract law alone adequately protect the companies
engaged in such research. For one, drafting a contract to prevent the
disclosure of these types of information-such as recombinant DNA
strains or the genes within a selectively-bred animal-would be
extremely difficult, as the information is microscopic and difficult to
define within the parameters of an employment or business
contract.42 Much of this information is also highly dynamic in the
sense that these scientific processes involve continued alterations and
modifications to existing genetic codes; it would be difficult to
determine which genetic strain at a given moment was the one worthy
of protecting. 143  Finally, from a more practical standpoint, many
agricultural companies engaged in such genetic-enhancement
research may fail to draft adequate confidentiality agreements with
their customers, or they may fail to draft any written contract at all.144
Trade secrets law offers an additional research incentive to these
companies that contract law does not provide. 45 Companies involved
in genetic enhancement should be encouraged to conduct their
research with the knowledge that they will be protected under state
trade secrets law, regardless of whether they make efforts to draft a
thoroughly-worded contract with their customers.
Moreover, even if a contract were capable of being drafted to
prevent the disclosure of this type of information-for example, by
using general confidentiality language forbidding the disclosure of a
company's proprietary genetic strains-that fact would not diminish
the need for additional protection under trade secrets law. Although
confidentiality provisions in contracts are one method used to protect
confidential proprietary information, they are by no means the sole
method. 46 The monetary remedies available to companies under the
trade secrets statutes are more substantial than the remedies of
141. See supra note 90.
142. See Sellers, supra note 123, at 270 (describing selective breeding as
"unpredictable").
143. Id. (explaining that the unpredictable nature of selective breeding arises partly
because "there is no guarantee that the desired characteristics will surface in the
offspring").
144. See, e.g., In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1986)
(considering "the size and nature of the business" in assessing whether a trade secret was
kept secret).
145. See MILGRIM, supra note 71, § 4.01 (stating that a trade secret may receive
protection even in the absence of an express agreement).
146. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d
541,546 (M.D.N.C. 2002).
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contract law. 147 Moreover, the North Carolina General Assembly, in
adopting the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act, did not
intend for a trade secrets claim to be wholly precluded if information
were sufficiently protected via a confidentiality provision in a
contract. On the contrary, many trade secrets disputes arise even
with clear contract terms in place.148 As the facts of North Carolina
Farm Partnership so clearly illustrate, a company deserves additional
legal protection under the rubric of trade secrets law in the event a
written contract between the parties fails to adequately prevent a
misappropriation.
One federal appeals court has observed that "[a] trade secret
once lost is, of course, lost forever. '149 Because of the secret nature of
a trade secret, once it has been discovered and exploited by a third
party, it loses much of its commercial value. In PIC's case, competitor
companies like NCF may now freely use its genetically-modified pigs
to breed additional offspring with favorable genetic traits; the
company has no protection for its proprietary interest in the original
gene lines. One can hope that the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina's narrow approach to trade secrets protection is limited
solely to the particulars of PIC's case. And yet the court's blanket
statement concerning "the application of trade secrets law to animals"
suggests otherwise. 5° If indeed the court's ruling is intended to apply
to all who would invoke trade secrets law in the context of any type of
genetic research, the court's holding was in error. In light of the
broad language of the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act,
in light of analogous cases from other jurisdictions, and in light of the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina should have recognized that
the Act includes protections for the genetic material located inside
selectively-bred living organisms. Its failure to have done so will have
long-term detrimental effects on both companies involved in such
research, as well as the general public.
JOHN M. MOYE
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154 (2003) (allowing an additional recovery of punitive
damages in the event a "willful" misappropriation of a trade secret is shown).
148. See, e.g., Static Control, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 542-46 (recognizing a trade secrets
claim, even though the confidentiality provision in an agreement would have provided a
remedy under contract law).
149. FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61,63 (2d Cir. 1984).
150. N.C. Farm P'ship v. Pig Improvement Co., Inc., 163 N.C. App 318, 323,593 S.E.2d
126, 130, discretionary review denied, 358 N.C. 544, 599 S.E.2d 401 (2004).
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